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Commercial Paper: Some Aspects of
Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code
By FAmFAX LFARY, JR.*
Of all the major articles of the Uniform Commercial Code,
perhaps Article 3 makes the fewest changes from prior law.
Article S replaces in part the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law. It is necessary to say that Article 8 replaces the N.I.L.
in part, because some matters formerly covered by the N.I.L.
are now relegated to other articles of the Code, while some
matters not covered by the N.I.L. are treated by Article 3 of the
Code.
It is not possible in the space alloted to do more than give a
brief view of Article 8. Detailed analysis on a topic-by-topic
basis must be sought elsewhere. All that this paper can do is to
discuss, briefly, the "why and wherefore" of Article 3 and ex-
amine a few instances of its application in sufficient detail to give
the reader some flavor of the whole, and to allay any fears that
the law has been drastically or radically changed.
REASONS FOR CHANGING THE N.I.L.
At the threshold, the question naturally arises as to why the
N.I.L., earliest of the uniform laws, sired by Brewster out of
Crawford,' to use a horseman's phrase, needed to be changed at
all. As we know, the impetus for that statute came from Judge
F. Lyman Brewster of Connecticut when he, as President of the
National Conference of State Boards of Commissioners for Pro-
* A.B. 1932, Princeton University; LL.B. 1935, Harvard Law School; Member
Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Formerly Professor of
Law, University of Pennsylvania; Assistant Reporter for Article 3 and Reporter
for Article 4, Uniform Commercial Code.
1See Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 78-8 (7th ed. Beutel 1948)
(hereinafter cited as Beutel).
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moting Uniformity of Legislation in the United States, secured
the appointment, at the August, 1895, meeting of that body,
of a committee to draft an act to make uniform the law con-
cerning negotiable instruments. The Committee hireO Mr. J. J.
Crawford of the New York bar to serve as principal draftsman.
Mr. Crawford's draft was ready for discussion by the Committee
about three and a half months later. It was considered at the
August, 1896, meeting of the Conference of Commissioners and
was recommended for adoption by the states. In the following
year it was adopted by four states, 2 including Connecticut, judge
Brewster's home state.
Contrast the more deliberate pace of the drafting of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Work was started on Article 3 in
the last years of World War II, and the text was first presented for
adoption by the states in 1952, some seven years later.3 During
that time it had been subjected to scrutiny in whole or in part
in each year by both the Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and the entire body of the American Law In-
stitute, as well as by a Committee of Advisers and the Council of
the Institute. Then, as a result of a detailed study in New York,4
the Editorial Committee was re-activated and some revisions
made. The text of Article 3 as adopted in Kentucky, Massa-
chusetts, and Connecticut is the text of the 1957 edition result-
ing from a consideration of the New York study and criticism.5
The N.I.L. had been adopted throughout the United States,
and its territories and possessions, starting in 1897, with Georgia
falling in line in 1924 as the last state, and Puerto Rico and the
Canal Zone taking the plunge in 1933.' The Act has been the law
in Kentucky since 1904, or for fifty-five years.7
A preliminary inquiry, before the question of whether the
N.I.L. should be changed could be answered, is to determine
how much uniformity the N.I.L. did achieve. On basic funda-
2 Colo. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 64; Conn. Acts 1897, oh. 74; Fla. Laws 1897,
oh. 4524; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1897, cl. 612.3 Uniform Commercial Code (1952 draft).
4 State of New York, Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1955:
Study of the Uniform Commercial Code (3 Volumes). Article 3 is covered in
Volume 2 at pp. 767-1215.
5 Act of October 2, 1959 (S.B. 689). (Hereinafter cited as UCC.)
6 See the table of states and territories which have adopted the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law in Beutel 1353.
7Ky. Acts 1904, oh. 102.
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mentals, one must answer unequivocably that it accomplished
a very great deal. Yet there were many statutory variations in
the various adoptions. Kentucky departed from the Commis-
sioners' text in some twenty-one sections, Arizona in fifty-one
sections, Pennsylvania in two, and Puerto Rico in only one sec-
tion.8 Professor Frederick K. Beutel has noted some seventy-
seven instances of divisions of authority in the interpretation
of this uniform act, without including variations due to subse-
quent amendments, statutory differences, or special supple-
mentary statutesf
Candor, however, compels the statement that in most of this
rather frighteningly large number of non-uniform situations, the
courts were dealing with the unusual or non-recurrent case.
Some few of the situations were, however, serious, and some
resulted from the very all-inclusive coverage of the N.I.L. But,
basically, there was a substantial core of uniformity.
On this record, some modification and revision of the N.I.L.
would appear fully justified. When the drafting of Article 3 was
begun, the very first problem faced was whether the draftsman
should work within the framework of the old N.I.L. and patch
up the weak spots, or proceed. in a different manner. It soon
became apparent that a patchwork job just could not be done.
In the first place, where the seventy-seven divisions of author-
ity existed, language must be changed to secure uniformity.
No court would be very apt to change its prior considered deci-
sions if the same language were retained and re-enacted, no
matter what the official comments accompanying the uniform
act might say. In the second place, certain changes were in-
evitable from the very concept of an integrated commercial
code covering almost all -phases of commercial law. In the third
place, the great changes in the methods of doing business, occur-
ing during the past sixty years, made obsolete some of the ma-
terial in the N.I.L., showed the need for revision in some other
parts, and pointed to the need of restricting the all-inclusive
coverage of the statute in other respects.
Finally, on a careful and objective analysis, it was felt that
decided improvements in organization of material could be made
by some consolidation and re-arrangement of the subject matter.
8 See the list of variations by the several states in Beutel 1355.
9 Beutel 89 n. 40.
[Vol. 48,
COMmERCIAL PA Rx
ARmANGEMENT OF MATEmAL IN ARTICLE 3
Article 8 was ultimately divided into eight parts, as follows:
(1) Form and Interpretation, which includes primarily the ma-
terial usually considered under the topic "formal requisites of
a negotiable instrument"; (2) Transfer and Negotiation, which
covers the types of indorsement and their effects; (3) Rights of
a Holder, wherein is treated the problem of that central character
of negotiable instruments law, the "sniveling holder in due
course"; (4) Liability of Parties, or the specification of the con-
tracts of maker, drawer, acceptor, and indorser and the war-
ranties of each; (5) Presentment, Notice of Dishonor and Protest,
a sufficiently self-explanatory heading; (6) Discharge, which also
includes the effect of certain actions on the liability of accom-
modation parties. These six are the most important of the eight
parts. Part 7 is a single section on the effect of the letter of
advice of an international sight draft and part 8, captioned
"Miscellaneous," aside from covering drafts in a set, deals with
certain matters not covered by the N.I.L.1 °
In each part, the various matters covered can be classified
under four headings: first, that which is unchanged; second, that
which is clarified, including the changing of some decisions
in some states; third, instances reflecting a change in policy;
and fourth, matters not covered by any section of the N.I.L.,
where experience indicated the need of statutory treatment.
Actually, Article 3 reduces the 196 sections of the N.I.L. to
seventy-nine. Of these, some eleven sections must be eliminated
from the comparison because they relate to matters not covered
directly by the N.I.L. The remaining sixty-eight sections cover
about 885 lines of print as compared with approximately 1,300
lines in the N.I.L.
But, in substance, the job done by Article 3 is a job of tidying
10 The Reporter for Article 3 was William L. Prosser, Dean of the School
of jurisprudence at The University of California at Berkeley, California. The
writer was an Assistant Reporter for matters affecting bank collections. Much
thought and time were spent on the article by Professors Karl N. Llewellyn and
Soia Mentschikoff, Chief Reporter and Assistant Chief Reporter, respectively,
and by the Committee of Advisers, consisting of Professor William E. Britton,
University of Illinois; Honorable John T. Loughran, Kingston, New York; Willard
B. Luther, Esq., Boston, Massachusetts; Professor Maurice H. Merrill, University
of Oklahoma School of Law; Mr. Wilbert Ward, New York City; and Honorable
John D Wickem Madison, Wisconsin. Much consideration was also given by
the editorial board of the Code, by the council and membership of the American
Law Institute, and by the Commercial Acts section of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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up around the edges, of eliminating matter not properly a part
of the law of commercial paper, and of codifying, for the sake
of good practice, a few areas left to the common law by the
N.I.L.11
SOURCE MATERIALS FOR ARTICLE 3
The vast bulk of the material in Article 3 can be quite readily
traced to its ancestry in the source materials studied by the rep-
ortorial staff of the Code charged with responsibility for Article
3. Basically, these materials consisted of the N.I.L., fifty-odd
years of court decisions under that uniform act, the common
law before the N.I.L., the British Bills of Exchange Act and
the decisions interpreting it, the various law review articles
written about both statutes, and, in particular, the celebrated
controversy between Judge Brewster and Dean Ames of Har-
vard,1" in which, as so often happens, both were very largely right.
It has always seemed to the writer a bit unfortunate that
the approach was so domestic in its scope." After all, the bill
of exchange is, and historically was, a truly international doc-
ument. In today's world we deal not only with other states of
the United States and with other English-speaking countries,
but also with European, South American, Asian, and African
areas. They, too, have legal systems, some of which were highly
advanced when ours was in its infancy. Many of these areas
have faced essentially the same problems, and have reached
civilized solutions. There have been some attempts at achieving
international unity. Efforts to produce a negotiable instru-
ments law that might bring about such unity resulted in the
Hague Convention in 1912 and the Geneva Convention in 1930,
11 E.g., UCC § 8-119, Other Writings Affecting Instrument; § 8-120, Instru-
ments "Payable Through" Bank; § 8-122, Accrual of Cause of Action; § 8-406,
Negligence Contributing to Alteration or Unauthorized Sigature; § 8-416, Con-
tract of Guarantor; § 8-510, Evidence of Dishonor and Notice of Dishonor;
§ 8-602, Effect of Discharge Against Holder in Due Course.
12rAmes: "The Negotiable Instruments Law," 14 Harv. L. Rev. 241 (1900);
"The Negotiable Instruments Law-A Word Move," 14 Harv. L. Rev. 442 (1901);
"The Negotiable Instruments Law-Necessary Amendments," 16 Harv. L. Rev.
225 (1908).
Brewster: "A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law," 10 Yale L. ~.84
(1901); "The Negotiable Instruments Law. A Rejoinder to Dean Ames,' 15
Harv. L. Rev. 26 (1901).
McKeehan, "The Negotiable Instruments Law. A Review of the Ames-
Brewster Controversy," 41 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 487, 499, 561 (1902).
13 Husted & Leary, "An Approach to Drafting an International Commercial
Code and a Modus Operandi Under Present Laws," 49 Colum. L. Rev. 1070
(1949).
[Vol. 48,
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neither of which had much influence on Anglo-American law.
While Article 3 was, so to speak, still in the womb of its spon-
sors, the Inter-American Bar Association at its 1947 meeting in
Lima, Peru, and at its 1949 meeting in Detroit, Michigan, was
considering what could be done to achieve some Inter-American
uniformity between our law and that of our neighbors to the
south. Only one or two minor nods towards international unifica-
tion of the law were, however, made in the Code.14
To many people, however, it may be reassuring to note that
Article 3 does not adopt any "strange" foreign approach, but
is basically as American in development and concept as the
hot dog and Coca-Cola, although it must be admitted that, at
the moment, Article 3 does not have quite the same popular
appeall
GEomA,. EXCLUSIONS
Article 3 is entitled "Commercial Paper," and its title reflects
a basic policy decision as to the coverage of the article. Elim-
inated from the scope of Article 3 are all types of instruments
qualifying as investment securities under Article 8 of the Code.'15
Thus, the Code solves an area of considerable difficulty occa-
sioned by the rulings, based upon the reasoning described below,
that the N.I.L. applied to corporate bonds.
In section 1, the N.I.L. apparently pre-empted the field of
negotiability by providing that "an instrument to be negotiable
must conform to the following requirements: .. ." At first blush,
14 Compare UCO § 3-110(l) making negotiable a bill designated on its
face as "exchange" or the like, with the civil law rule making the words "bill
of exchange" a substitute for words of order.
The civil law custom of using the words "good as avar to indicate that
the signer of the phrase intends to be bound as a surety, can be recognized and
given effect under the broader language of UCC §§ 3-415 and 3-416.
UCC § 3-507(4) giving effect to a term in a bill allowing a stated time
for re-presentment in the event of any dishonor by non-acceptance of a time
draft, or by non-payment of a sight draft, permits parties to stipulate the civil
law rule allowing the holder to present again in these circumstances without losing
rights against secondary parties. See Report of the Drafting Committee, League
Nations Document No. C.860. M. 151 (1930) II at 141 n. 105.
15 UCC § 8-102(a):
A 'security' is an instrument which
i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and
ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets
or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in
as a medium for investment; and(iii) is either one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into
a class or series of instruments; and
(iv) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or
in an enterprise or evidence an obligation of the issuer.
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this would appear to be an all-inclusive coverage of the field,
and to deny the quality of negotiability to any writing not meet-
ing the specified formal requisites, which thus become a bed
of Procrustes for all who would pass the test of negotiability.
The definition of "instrument" in N.I.L., section 191, as "nego-
tiable instrument" does not aid the situation for two reasons.
First, section 191 is prefaced by the usual clause "unless the
context otherwise requires," which permits a court to refuse to
read the section as "a negotiable instrument to be negotiable
must conform . . ." and to construe the section as "any writing
to be a negotiable instrument must conform.... ." Second, even
if the definition in section 191 were to be brought into section
1, it is still possible to argue that the statute had pre-empted
the field and that no other, way of achieving the magical qualities
of negotiability existed.
Such arguments, together with the requirement that the
promise to pay must be unconditional, created great difficulty in
the field of the corporate bond issue. The extensive trading in
these media of investments made negotiability a necessity.
Yet the rather inflexible requirements of the N.I.L. limited the
bond draftsman, in section 3(2), to a "statement of the trans-
action which gives rise to the instrument" and, in section 5, to
a provision which "authorizes the sale of collateral securities
if the instrument be not paid at maturity" and one which gives
the "holder an election to require something to be done in lieu
of the payment of money." Decisions such as ,King Cattle Co.
v. Joseph,16 and its Kentucky companion, Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co. v. Schmidt,1 however, found that the provisions in
the corporate bonds there under consideration were rendered
conditional by the reference to the trust indenture or other in-
strument securing the bonds. On the other hand, cases following
Enoch v. Brandon,' with almost identical language in the bond,
allowed the paper to be classed as negotiable.
In such a state of the law, the cautious statutory draftsman
of any act relating to bonds, particularly in the field of municipal
bonds, inserted a section providing that the bonds issued there-
under would have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable
16158 Minn. 481, 198 N.W. 798 (1924).
17 245 Ky. 432, 53 S.W.2d 713 (1932).
18249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928).
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instruments. Such terms in the Kentucky statute relating to
bearer street-improvement bonds were given effect in Citizens
Trust & Guaranty Co. v. Hays.9 Some general statutes were also
adopted in other states.
In addition, the rather common practice of trading in over-
due and defaulted bonds caused considerable difficulty on the
issues of determining rights in overdue paper.20
Consequently, it was felt advisable to subject bond issues
to a set of rules that would be somewhat different from those
applicable to the commercial draft, note, and check, and this is
done in Article 8 of the Code.
A second great area which was given separate treatment
was the law of bank collections. By section 3-103(2), all of
Article 3 is subjected to the terms of Article 4 when an instru-
ment is being collected through banking channels. This was a
necessary provision because developments in the field of bank
collections, including the use of electronic sorting and comput-
ing machines which handle incredibly large numbers of items
per minute, required a far different statutory treatment from
that accorded the documentary draft or trade acceptance being
presented to a business house for payment.
With these major areas eliminated, it was possible to con-
centrate on the area of commercial paper: the draft, including,
of course, the trade acceptance; the note; the certificate of de-
posit; and certain aspects of the check. Also, since attributes
of negotiability were to be accorded in other articles to other
paper, Article 3 departed from the all-inclusive nature of the
N.I.L. The preamble to section 3-104 states: "Any writing to be
a negotiable instrument within this Article must . . ." The key
words, "within this Article," may be the basis on which the courts
will continue the common-law development of negotiability for
forms of paper not covered by Article 3. It is true that originally
the purpose of the drafters was to have a "tight" statute and to
19167 Ky. 560, 180 S.W. 811 (1915); cf. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 279.180 (1948)
(rural electric co-operative societies). Ala. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 22(1940) (elec-
tric membership corporations) and the acts creating the various state turnpike
commissions and other authorities usually provide that the bonds of such com-
missions shall "have all of the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments."
The Hofstader Act in New York is a more general approach. N.Y. Pers. Prop.
Law art. 8, §§ 260-262. California, Canal Zone, and Nevada have variously
amended N.I.L. § 184 to cover the problem. Beutel 201.
20 Chafee, "Rights in Overdue Paper," 31 Harv. L. Rev. 1104 (1918).
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KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
forestall the concept of "negotiability by contract." To this end,
as well as for other reasons, section 8-104(1) (b) of the Code
provided "that for any writing to be negotiable within Article 3,
it must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain... and no other promise, order, obligation or power given
by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article.....
But this limitation applies only to writings that are to be nego-
tiable instruments "within this Article." Section 1-103 of the
Code provides that the general principles of law and equity,
"including the law merchant," shall continue to apply "unless
displaced by the particular provisions of this Act." Hence, it is
now possible that, under the Code, certain attributes of negoti-
ability may be given to other types of paper. Official comment
#2 to section 2-104 of the Code leans in this direction by saying:
While a writing cannot be made a negotiable instrument
within this Article by contract or by conduct, nothing in
this section is intended to mean that in a particular case
a court may not arrive at a result similar to that of negoti-
ability by finding that the obligor is estopped by conduct
from asserting a defense against a bona fide purchaser....
But a contract to build a house or employ a workman,
or equally a security agreement does not become a
negotiable instrument by the mere insertion of a clause
agreeing that it shall be one.
The point to be made, however, is that the courts may not feel
themselves to be even as restricted as the official comment would
indicate in view of the fact that the statutory text refers to what
is a negotiable instrument "within this Article."2 1
Somm CHANGES iN FonRAL REQmisrrEs
Article 8 of the Code continues the basic formal requisites
of negotiability; i.e., that there must be a signed writing con-
taining an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain
in money on demand or at a definite time to bearer or to the
order of a payee specified with reasonable certainty.
Such a statement is contained in section 8-104(1) coupled
21 See e.g., Beutel, "Negotiability by Contract," 28 Ill. L. Rev. 205 (1943);
Leary, "Some Clarifications In the Law of Commercial Paper Under The Pro-
posed Commercial Code," 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 354, 358-360 (1949); Note,
"Negotiability of Conditional Sales Contracts," 57 Yale L.J. 1414 (1948).
[Vol. 48,
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with the limitation that the instrument must not contain any
other promise, order, obligation, or power given by the maker
or drawer except as authorized by Article 3. This is followed
by separate sections further refining the several elements and
permitting most commonly used terms and powers.22
Certainty of Time
To the student of the N.I.L., the above statement of the formal
requisites of negotiability has a familiar ring. He will miss the
old words, "fixed or determinable future time," and this was
intended. The Code, section 3-109(2), in a deliberate policy
change, reverses the rule of section 4(3) of the N.I.L. awarding
negotiability to instruments payable after events "certain to
happen, though the time of happening be uncertain." Typically,
this class of instrument was represented by the "post obit" note
signed by the impatient nephew desirous of anticipating his
inheritance from an elderly maiden aunt. The official comment
to the section stresses the fact that no good reason exists for
according such an instrument free circulation as a negotiable
instrument. The comment also refers to a note payable "one
year after the war" or at a similar uncertain date as being likely
to be "made under unusual circumstances suggesting good reason
for preserving defenses of the maker." One other instance, how-
ever, does occur, and that is the "on arrival" draft; i.e., the draft
payable "on arrivar' of the goods at the town of the payee, or
ten days after arrival of goods or the like. Such a draft is specially
treated with respect to the bank collection aspects of the prob-
lem in Article 4.23 It could, of course, be argued that goods
shipped are not certain to arrive, so that even under the N.I.L.
such a draft was payable on a contingency and so not negotiable,
22 UCC § 3-105, When Promise or Order Unconditional; § 3-106, Sum Cer-
tain; § 3-107, Money; § 3-108, Payable on Demand; § 3-109, Definite Time, §
3-110, Payable to Order; § 3-111, Payable to Bearer; § 3-112, Terms and Omis-
sions Not Affecting Negotiability.
23UCC § 4-502. When a draft or the relevant instructions require present-
ment 'on arrival," "when goods arrive" or the like, the collecting bank need not
present until in its judgment a reasonable time for arrival of the goods has ex-
pired. Refusal to pay or accept because the goods have not arrived is not a dis-
honor; the bank must notify its transferor of such refusal but need not present
the draft again until it is instiucted to do so or learns of the arrival of the goods.
An early case felt that such an instrument was not negotiable, although
there were other grounds for the holding. The Lykus, 36 Fed. 919 (S.D. N.Y.
1888). Mr. Paton, assistant general counsel for the American Bankers Association,
expressed the same opinion in 1915. 1 Paton's Digest 157, op. 1019 (1926 ed.),
ruling that, in consequence, protest of such a draft was not necessary.
1960]
KENTUcKY LAw JoRN.[ .
but this seems a bit far fetched, except in time of war. Under
the Code, however, a ruling against negotiability seems compelled.
Unconditional Promises or Orders
In section 3-105, a promise or order is deemed conditional
(and this, too, is familiar ground), if it states that it is to be paid
out of a particular fund or source.24 New, however, is the
qualification "except as provided in this section." The exceptions
confer negotiability upon two classes of instruments. The first
is where the repayment obligation is limited to the entire assets
of the issuing partnership, unincorporated association, trust, or
estate.25 Some cases under the N.I.L. were able to reach this
result,20 but the problem was a troublesome one elsewhere. The
other class is the governmental draft or note which is limited
to payment out of a particular fund of the issuing governmental
agency or to the proceeds of a particular tax.2
7
Certain matters, held in some cases to render the instrument
conditional, have also been specifically dealt with in the Code.
Section 3-105(1) (a) does not permit "implied or constructive
conditions" to destroy negotiability 8 Paragraph (b) of the same
subsection expands the old "statement of the transaction" rule29
and provides that a promise or order is not made conditional by
the fact that the instrument:
[s]tates its consideration, whether performed or promised,
or the transaction which gave rise to the instrument, or
that the promise or order is made or that the instrument
matures in accordance with or "as per" such transaction....
This language, certainly, makes it clear that trade acceptances
are negotiable although bearing the full federal reserve clause:
24 See the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (herein cited as N.I.L.) § 3,
When Promise is Unconditional.
25 UCC § 3-105 (h).
26E.g. Higgs v. Brown, 190 N.Y. 167, 82 N.E. 1108 (1907); Nelson Co. v.
Morton, 106 Cal. App. 144, 288 Pac. 845 (1930).
27 UCC § 3-105 (g).
28Cases have held under the N.I.L. that the recital of an executo promise
as consideration raises an implied condition that the instrument need not be
paid if the executory promise be not performed, and hence such an instrument
is not negotiable. E.g. National Bank in Salem v. Morgan, 132 Or. 515, 284 Pac.
582, 286 Pac. 558 (1930); Ivory v. Lamoreaux, 241 Mich. 226, 217 N.W. 54
(1928); contra, First Nat'l. Bank of Mariana v. Havana Canning Co., 142 Fla.
554, 195 So. 188 (1940); Siegle Cooper Co. v. Chicago Trust & Savings Bank,
131 Ill. 569, 23 N.E. 417 (1890).
29 N.I.L. § 3(2).
[Vol. 48,
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The obligation of the acceptor hereof arises out of the
purchase of goods from the drawer, maturity being in
accordance with the original terms of purchase.30
Yet the Code obviously cannot cover all situations and dis-
pense with all litigation. Paragraph (b) of section 1-105(1),
says that an instrument is negotiable even though it contains
a statement that it matures "as per" a transaction which gave
rise to it, and paragraph (c) of the same section allows an in-
strument to refer to, or state that it arises out of, a separate
agreement. Problems of interpretation will still arise as to
whether particular language comes within the permitted types,
or constitutes language stating that the instrument is subject to
or governed by another agreement, which under section 1-105(2)
(a), as under the N.I.L., makes the instrument non-negotiable.
The problem is similar to the cases involving the Reolo frauds,31
where Maryland on the one side and Pennsylvania and a federal
court in Minnesota on the other, took opposite positions as to
whether an acceptance was conditional which read "accepted
for payment as per Reolo contract for amount and date hereon."
The Maryland court felt that the "as per" clause, by reason of
the position of the words, put conditions on the promise to pay
and denied negotiability. The Pennsylvania court and the fed-
eral district court felt otherwise.
The Sum Certain
One or two specifically troublesome matters relating to the
"sum certain" have been clarified by section 3-106. Covering
familiar ground, the section provides that the sum payable is
a sum certain in a note or draft payable in stated installments
of principal, or payable with exchange or less exchange, or with
costs of collection or an attorney's fee, or both, upon default.
In addition, this section states that instruments payable with
stated different rates of interest before and after default "or a
30 Held to render the instrument not negotiable in First Natl Bank v. Power
Equipment Co., 211 Iowa 553, 283 N.W. 103 (1930); Westlake Mercantile
Finance Corp. v. Merritt, 204 Calif. 673, 269 Pac. 620 (1928). Contra: State Trad-
ing Corp. v. Jordan, 146 Pa. Super. 166, 22 A.2d 30 (1941); State Trading
Corp. v. Rosen, 126 Conn. 37, 9 A.2d 289 (1939); Heller v. Cuddy, 172 Minn.
126, 214 N.W. 924 (1927).
31 Int'l Finance Co. v. Northwestern Drug Co., 282 Fed. 920 (D. Minn.
1922); Int'l Finance Corp. v. Calvert Drug Co., 144 Md. 303, 124 Atl. 891
(1924); Int'l Finance Corp. v. Philadelphia Wholesale Drug Co., 312 Pa. 280,
167 At. 790 (1933).
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specified date" will be negotiable, as well as the instrument to
be paid "with a stated discount or addition if paid before or
after the date fixed for payment." These provisions make it clear
that negotiability is not affected by premium charges for an-
ticipating payment dates, by larger charges upon delayed pay-
ments, or by the use of a "discount note" allowing the maker,
for example, trade discounts if payment is made within thirty
days.8 2
Acceleration Clauses
Under the N.I.L., much trouble was caused by various forms
of acceleration clauses commonly used by lenders. The business
situation is that a lender is willing to make a loan for a specific
period of time, if all goes well. If, however, danger looms upon
the horizon, the lender wants to be able to pull his money out,
or at least have a matured debt. Many and varied are the
acceleration clauses devised to meet this situation, running the
gamut from automatic acceleration upon default in the payment
of an installment of principal or of interest through automatic
acceleration in the event of bankruptcy; acceleration at the
option of the holder upon the occurrence of events foreshadow-
ing trouble such as non-payment of taxes, the entry of judgments,
failure to post additional security, and the like, to acceleration
at the option of the holder "when he deems himself insecure."
The N.I.L. gave but little help. Section 2(8) expressly recog-
nized automatic acceleration upon default on an installment of
principal or of interest due on the note itself, in the section
defining the sum certain. In section 4, on time certainty, a note
payable "on or before a fixed or determinable future time"
was within the statutory language, but it was doubtful if the
"on or before" language was intended to cover more than the
common law "on or before" note which also gave to the maker
the right of prepayment at any time. A note expressed to be
payable "on demand" was, of course, always negotiable.
The courts tended to uphold automatic acceleration clauses,
were somewhat doubtful about optional clauses based upon
the happening of objective events, and looked rather askance
at the "deems himself insecure" clause. Many courts denied
82 See Commercial Credit Co. v. Nissen, 49 S.D. 303, 207 N.W. 61 (1926),
modified on rehearing, 51 S.D. 357, 218 N.W. 943 (1927); Capital City State
Bank v. Swift, 290 Fed. 505 (E.D. Okla. 1923).
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negotiability to such notes, and, indulging in semantics, re-
ferred to the clause as permitting acceleration at the "whim or
caprice" of the holder.3 Obviously, these courts had a feeling
that there was something nefarious about a time loan callable at
the will of the holder. The reasonable expectations of the bor-
rower, they said, could be defeated by the unfettered power of
acceleration. One trouble with this approach is that it appar-
ently assumes that borrowers as a class either do not under-
stand the English language, or else they do not read the notes
they sign. If the acceleration clause is in the note, its terms
and effect must necessarily be a part of any maker's reasonable
expectations. A further trouble was that the proposed cure, a
denial of negotiability, did not affect the supposed vice. The
acceleration was still good in the case of a non-negotiable note.
The only difference was that a maker's defenses against the
payee were also good against a holder in due course. Nor did
the denial of negotiability serve to stop the use of such clauses.
Faced with a choice, the financial interests chose freedom of
acceleration rather than negotiability, while making various
linguistic changes in the clauses in an effort to succeed on both
fronts.
The Code attacks the problem in another way. It provides,
in effect, that a note is negotiable although it is subject "to any
acceleration." This is done by section 3-109, which is concerned
with what constitutes a "definite time." Then, in Article 1 of the
Code, applicable generally, section 1-208 provides that a term
in any obligation or instrument for the acceleration of payment
or performance "at will" or "when he deems himself insecure"
or the like gives the power to accelerate only if the holder
honestly believes that the prospect of payment or performance
has become impaired. The burden of upsetting an acceleration
by showing that such honest belief did not exist is placed on
the maker of the note.
Thus, the legal issue will be on the very point stressed by
the courts, namely, whether the acceleration was proper or not,
and the decision will be whether the note is due or not due.
Defenses will not be let in against a holder in due course, even
on a proper acceleration, as under prior law.
33 See Beutel 275-282. See also Chafee, "Acceleration Provisions in Time
Paper," 32 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1919).
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At this point it may not be amiss to ask why we have formal
requisites of a negotiable instrument with rules as to sum certain
and time certain and so forth. Certainly, the old theories about
notes circulating as currency are no longer valid. Bills and notes
just do not circulate in that fashion any more. The seller's paper
is discounted at his bank and usually rests there, except when
forwarded for collection. Credits given between banks are about
the only "circulation" of paper today. Financial interests, it
is submitted, desire negotiability to separate the obligation
to pay money from the performance of the underlying
transaction out of which the obligation arises. They can be
induced to supply the credit necessary to complete that under-
lying transaction if their risk is reduced to a credit evaluation
risk of the type they are equipped to handle. If, however, in addi-
tion to the credit risk, those supplying the money that oils the
wheels of progress are made subject to performance risks and
quality-of-goods risks, then the money will not be as readily or
as cheaply supplied, and the whole pace of the economy will be
slowed. Equally, the ability to pay for goods while using them
will be denied to many to whom such avenues are now open.
On this line of reasoning, as well as on other grounds, the Code
is sound in permitting notes, or drafts, to remain negotiable
despite "any acceleration."
This solution to the acceleration problem is not, however,
without its amusing side. The post obit note, so carefully out-
lawed, returns to the fold of negotiable instruments by being
drafted as a note payable at, say, one hundred years hence, sub-
ject to acceleration, upon the death of the impatient nephew's
maiden aunt. So, too, the "on arrivar' drafts return to the fold
by being drawn payable at a safe date, subject to acceleration
if the goods arrive at an earlier date. The possibilities of the
carefully drafted acceleration clause are almost limitless, except
to the extent that the clauses will be construed as rendering the
sum payable uncertain or the promise to pay conditional, or are
outlawed on policy grounds as "schemes" or "devices" to evade
other rules, for we must not forget that the statutory permission
for any acceleration is found in the section amplifying what is
meant by "payable at a definite future time," and having no other
effect. 4
34 See UCC § 8-108(c) and comment 4 thereof.
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Miscellaneous
An example of the "tidying-up" process contained in the
Uniform Commercial Code is found in the Codes treatment of
checks, drafts, or notes drawn payable to "the Estate of Anna
Jones, deceased." Under the wording of the N.I.L., this type of
situation gave some trouble, since some courts ruled this to be
bearer paper.3 5 Common sense would seem to dictate that the
intent of the person making the instrument so payable was to
have it payable to the representative for the time being of the
estate, and section 8-110 of the Code so provides in express
language. Yet section 9 of the N.I.L. made an instrument pay-
able to bearer if it was payable to a fictitious or non-existent
person to the knowledge of the person making it so payable, and,
again, if the name of the payee did not purport to be the name
of any person. Thus, under the N.I.L., the ruling in favor of
bearer paper could not be said to be wholly without statutory
support. Departing from semantics, however, the real issue in
the cases was, "Who should bear the loss caused by the wrong-
doing of the person indorsing the paper in the name of the
estate?" Actually, there can be no reliance on the fictitious-
bearer character of the paper, and no good reason appears why
the purchaser of such paper, or a bank dealing with it, should
not ascertain whether or not the person with whom they were
dealing, in fact, had power and authority to indorse for the estate.
Another gap in the N.I.L. was filled when the Code intro-
duced a section dealing with the draft "payable through" a
named bank,36 as insurance company drafts are often drawn.
Obviously, "payable through" was meant to denote something
different than "payable at," which the N.I.L. in several states,
including Kentucky, made the equivalent of an order to the
bank to pay out of the maker's or drawer's account.37 Earlier
drafts of the Code took the position that the bank named in the
"payable through" clause was the sole presenting bank. This
position was abandoned when further investigation uncovered
the fact that many insurance companies took presentments
from banks other than the "payable through" bank. Hence, in
35 McCollum v. Loveless, 185 Ga. 748, 196 S.E. 430 (1938); In re Ziegen-
hein 187 S.W. 893 (Mo. App. 1916).
3o UCC § 3-120.
37 N.I.L. § 87; cf. UCC § 3-121.
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the final draft, section 3-120 provides that the clause simply
designates a collecting bank to make presentment.
Section 8-121 continues the N.I.L. wording that a note or an
acceptance "payable at" a bank is an order on the bank to pay
out of any available funds of the maker or acceptor. This Code
section may not be the same in all states, as the studies made
in the preparation of the Code indicated that there was a greater
divergence of opinion and practice on the effect of a note pay-
able at a bank than on almost any other point. In some instances,
there were different practices in the same state. One point of
view follows the literal wording, and when a note or accept-
ance "payable at" is presented, the instrument is paid without
more ado if the obligor's account is in funds. This may be called
the "commercial" viewpoint. The other practice is that the words
"payable at" merely designate a place for presentment or pay-
ment, and no payment should be made without additional
authorization from the obligor. The instrument is returned dis-
honored in some cases unless authorization is received. This
might be called the "rural" viewpoint, for it seems to be strongest
in rural areas where the farmer desires to control the application
of his cash, quite often a scarce commodity. While it is true that
an order to pay cash can be cancelled, the rural obligor may not
remember to issue the countermand, especially if his habit and
custom is founded in the opposite practice. Indeed, in some
states having the "order to pay" statutory language in the N.I.L.,
banking practice was to advise the obligor by telephone and
request instructions before paying. The rural fear that the
banker's message might not be received and be answered, plus
the banker's general insistence on .a written countermand of a
written order to pay, generated in many areas an insurmountable
resistance to the "order to pay" language.
The American Law Institute decided that, in this area, the
concept of uniformity could be waived and offered alternate
sections to the states. 8 In Kentucky, as in Pennsylvania, Mass-
3s UCC § 3-121. Instruments Payable at Bank.
Alternative A:
A note or acceptance which states that it is payable at a bank is the
equivalent of a draft drawn on the bank payable when it falls due out of
any funds of the maker or acceptor in current accounts or otherwise avail-
able for such payment.
[Vol. 48,
CO~MMnmCLA PAPER
achusetts, and Connecticut, the order-to-pay alternative was
adopted. Perhaps the Code's recognition of the oral countermand,
plus the additional twenty-four hours resulting from the "de-
ferred posting" provisions of Article 4 have done much to allay
rural fears. The practice of notifying the obligor and requesting
instructions can be continued in rural areas. If the instructions
received are not to pay, even if oral, they would be effective
as an oral stop order for a far longer period than the time in which
the bank must return the instrument.3 9
Som:E CHANGES IN Tim LAW AS TO INDORSEMENTS
The Code clarifies several areas in that portion of the nego-
tiable instruments law dealing with the effect of indorsements,
or the lack of them. The first of these is in the area of the re-
strictive indorsement.
Restrictive Indorsements
Section 86 of the N.I.L., together with the Bank Collection
Code of the American Bankers Association,40 classified three
factually diverse situations under the label "restrictive indorse-
ment." These were: (1) the indorsement prohibiting further
negotiation; (2) the indorsement to a fiduciary; and (8) the
indorsement "for deposit" or "for collection" or "pay any bank,
banker or trust company"; that is, the indorsement for bank
collection. Under sections 37 and 47 of the N.I.L., however,
all three types of indorsement had the same effect. The restric-
tive indorsee had the right to receive payment, to bring any ac-
tion his indorser could bring, and, except in the case of the in-
dorsement prohibiting further transfer, the power to transfer
such rights as he had. Section 47 stated pretty clearly that a
restrictive indorsement terminated the negotiability of an in-
strument.
The result of these sections was that it was difficult, if not
Alternative B:
A note or acceptance which states that it is payable at a bank is not of
itself an order or authorization to the bank to pay it.
39 See UCC § 4-303.
4 0 Bank Collection Code states: Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
Wyoming.
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impossible, for a restrictive indorsee to become a holder in due
course in his own right, no matter how pure in heart or how
great the value paid.4 1 He was limited to the actions his in-
dorser could bring, and could only transfer that privilege to
others.4 Such a limitation on the indorsee's rights of action would
be fine, if we assume that the indorsement was by A and read,
"Pay to B in trust for A," since rarely, if ever, did a trustee give
value to his cestui que trust. The same rule should, perhaps,
apply where the indorsement constitutes the indorsee the agent
of the indorser. In such cases, limiting the indorsee to the posi-
tion of the indorser ordinarily does not make for inequitable
results. Yet there is nothing inconsistent with an agent advanc-
ing funds to a principal, and such an agent should, despite some
N.I.L. holdings, be able to attain an independent holder-in-due-
course status, at least to the extent of his advances. This is par-
ticularly advisable between a depositor principal and an agent
collecting bank.
But, followed literally, the words of the N.I.L. apply the
"restrictive" indorsement concept to an indorsement from A
"to B as trustee for C". Ingenious theories have been advanced
in an attempt to confer holder in due course status on B,4' but
it is difficult to see the advantage of B being denominated a
holder in due course if he is limited to the actions his indorser
could bring. Nor is B helped if any purchaser from B must be
no more than a mere assignee.
The Code, however, avoids the problem, after some backing
and filling in early drafts. It recognizes the restrictive indorsement
idea in section 8-205, covering these four types: (1) conditional;
(2) purporting to prohibit further transfer; (3) including words
such as "for deposit" or other words signifying a transfer for
deposit or collection; or (4) otherwise stating that it is for the
benefit either of the indorser or someone else. Section 3-206,
however, pertaining to the effect of a restrictive indorsement,
provides separate treatment for the several types. There is no
counterpart in the Code to the provisions of section 47 of the
41 E.g., Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wise. 326, 175 N.W. 93
(1919); Werner Piano Co. v. Henderson, 121 Ark. 165, 180 S.W. 495 (1915);
Honan v. Nat'l Thrift Corp. of America, 14 Cal. App. 2d 458, 57 P. 2d 967 (1936).
42 N.I.L. § 37.
43 See e.g. Chafee, "Remarks on Restrictive Indorsements," 58 Harv. L. Rev.
1182 (1945).
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N.I.L. terminating negotiability. On the contrary, subsection
(1) of section 3-206 flatly states that no restrictive indorsement
prevents further transfer or negotiation. Subsection (2) pro-
vides that the restrictive indorsement neither affects nor gives
notice to an intermediary or to a collecting bank unless it is the
indorsement of the bank's immediate transferor. Thus, to digress
for a moment, the Code does not go as far as the new Cheques
Act, 1957, in England where the need of any indorsement is
abolished altogether once an instrument is transferred to a bank.4
Subsection (8) deals with the conditional indorsement and the
indorsement for collection, and requires any transferee, except
an intermediary bank, to pay or apply any value given by him
consistently with the indorsement. As the section uses the term
"transferee," it does not cover a payor. The section is, however,
reinforced by section 8-603(1) (b), providing that any failure
to pay in a manner consistent with such an indorsement prevents
such non-conforming payment from being a discharge. What
actions are consistent with the indorsement depend, of course,
upon the type of condition or limitation specified in the indorse-
ment. In the case of the "for collection," "for deposit," or the
"pay any bank," form of indorsement, any action in the normal
routine of collection would be consistent, since the purpose and
terms of the indorsement are to effect collection, or, in the case
of an indorsement to a depositary bank, to secure a credit to the
indorser's account.
Section 3-206(4) provides, in the case of the fiduciary in-
dorsement, that the first taker must pay or apply any value given
by him for or on the security of the instrument consistently with
the terms of the indorsement and that a later holder is not
affected by the restrictive indorsement unless he has actual
knowledge that the fiduciary has negotiated the instrument for
his own benefit or otherwise in breach of trust or duty. Thus,
in effect, the Code conforms to the policy of the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act in the treatment of the fiduciary indorsement.4 5
Section 3-206 also specifically states that, if he qualifies (in-
cluding, of course, compliance with the rules as to his payment
or application of value as provided in the section), the indorsee
44 Cheques Act. 1957. See debates in 204 H.L. Deb. (5th Ser.) 667-692
(1957). Negrah, "Cheques Act. 1957," 78 J. Inst. Bankers 254 (1957).
45 See Uniform Fiduciaries Act § 2.
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under a restrictive indorsement may be a holder in due course,
as may later holders.
Thus, an uncertain and confused situation under the N.I.L.
has, it is believed, been rather neatly clarified in accordance
with good business practice and needs.
The Once-Bearer-Paper-Always-Bearer-Paper Dogma
Another situation that caused trouble under the N.I.L. is
more clearly dealt with under the Code. Under section 40 of the
N.I.L., when an instrument payable to bearer was indorsed
specially, it was nevertheless subject to further negotiation by
delivery. Under section 9(5), an instrument was payable to
bearer "when the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in
blank."
Thus a note payable to order became payable to bearer when
indorsed in blank. Under section 40 of the N.I.L. it apparently
remained subject to further negotiation by delivery even though it
was later specially indorsed. Also, it was possible to argue by
negative inference from section 9(5) that an instrument was no
longer payable to bearer when the last indorsement was a special
indorsement, since it no longer complied with the literal word-
ing of any of the subdivisions of section 9 on when an instru-
ment is payable to bearer.
The most satisfactory solution seemed to be to limit section
40 to instruments payable to bearer on the face of the paper,
and let section 9(5) and the negative inferences therefrom apply
to paper originally payable to order. This was thought to con-
form to the supposed desires of the maker or drawer of paper,
which was bearer paper on its face, who wished to make a pay-
ment in due course and be discharged without liability for
forged indorsements and the like. But this payor protection,
in practice, was found to be desired, in fact, almost exclusively
in the case of investment securities which are not subject to
Article 3 of the Code.
As one of its few changes of policy, the Code reverses the
rule of N.I.L., section 40, and provides in section 3-204(1) that
"any" instrument which is specially indorsed becomes payable
to the order of the special indorsee, whose indorsement is neces-
sary to further transfer. There is no counterpart of section 40 or
[Vol. 48,
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of section 9(5). Section 8-204(2) specifically provides that an
order instrument indorsed in blank is payable to bearer and
is negotiated by delivery until it is specially indorsed, or in-
dorsed for collection. Thus the Code clarifies, by specific treat-
ment, an area which was, to say the least, ambiguous under
the N.I.L.
Payee as Holder in Due Course
Under the N.I.L., a serious conflict existed as to whether
a payee could ever be a holder in due course.46 Section 52 of
the N.I.L. appeared to require that the instrument be "nego-
tiated" to the payee, and some courts felt that a payee necessarily
acquired his title by "issue." The N.I.L. in section 191 defined
"issue" as "the first delivery of the instrument, complete in form,
to a person who takes it as a holder." N.I.L., section 30, on what
constitutes "negotiation," refers to the transfer of the instru-
ment from one person to another in such a manner as to con-
stitute the transferee a holder, and provides "if payable to bearer
it is negotiated by delivery; if payable to order it is negotiated
by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery."
The definition of a "holder" includes specifically "the payee ...
of a bill or note, who is in possession of it." Clearly, a payee,
who is a holder, ought therefore to be able to qualify as a holder
in due course, if he met the requirements of taking (1) a com-
plete and regular instrument (2) before it was overdue (3) in
good faith and for value and (4) without notice of a defect
or infirmity or of previous dishonor. That is to say, it would
have been clear, had not the statutory text prefaced number 4
with the words "that at the time it was negotiated to him," thus
raising the problem of whether there was a difference between
taking by "issue" or by "negotiation" in determining who could
become a holder in due course. The Code settles the issue by
a clear and unequivocable statement in section 3-302(2) that a
payee may be a holder in due course, and by eliminating the
phrase "that at the time it was negotiated to him he had
notice .... "
This will change the law in Kentucky, which, apparently,
favored the view that a payee could not be a holder in due
46 See Beutel 88 n. 31, 355-56, 675-90.
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course,47 while making no change in the law of Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut.
SOME CHANGES AS To LiAiLrr OF PAR=Ts
Several problems as to the extent of the liability of persons
whose names appeared on a negotiable instrument have been
clarified by the more precise handling of the problem by the
Code, and in one or two instances the rules have changed the law.
The Undelivered, Incomplete Instrument
Under the N.I.L., it was no defense to the claim of a holder
in due course that a completed instrument had not been de-
livered. 8 Nor, if there had been a delivery of an incompleted
instrument, was it a defense to such a claim that completion
was not in accordance with what was intended. Put the two
together, however, and a so-called "real defense" came into being;
that is, the holder in due course did not prevail, conceivably
even if the instrument were completed as intended by the non-
delivering drawer or maker.50
The Code, by section 3-115(2), treats the problem of the
liability of the signer of a paper intended to be an instrument,
but incomplete in one or more respects, as one of material alter-
ation even if the instrument had not been delivered, and in sec-
tion 3-407(3) provides that a holder in due course may enforce
any incompleted instrument as completed. Of course, the holder
in due course cannot recover if the paper was never signed, or
if the signed paper was never intended to be an instrument.5 1
47 Southern Nat1 Life Realty Corp. v. People's Bank, 178 Ky. 80, 198 S.W.
543 (1917); but cf. Thompson v. Peck, 217 Ky. 766, 290 S.W. 722 (1927) and
Rider v. Roberts, 255 Ky. 266, 73 S.W. 2d 17, 261 Ky. 317, 87 S.W. 2d 611 (1935).
Before the adoption of the Code: Baggish v. Offengand, 97 Conn. 312, 116
Ad. 614 (1922); Russell v. Bond & Goodwin, 276 Mass. 458, 177 N.E. 627
(1931); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Girard Trust Co., 307 Pa. 488, 161 AUt. 865
(1932), 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 333 (1933).
Tb cases from the various other states are collected in Beutel 675-690.
48 N.I.L. § 16.
49 N.I.L. § 14.
5o N.I.L. § 15; Dial v. Peoples Loan, 66 Ga. App. 838, 19 S.E.2d 347 (1942);
Holzman, Cohen & Co. v. Teague, 158 N.Y. Supp. 211 (1916).
51 Notwithstanding the adoption of the so-called rule of "subjective intent"
with respect to the "good faith of a holder in due course, the writer suggests
that a rule of "objective intent" should govern in these situations. What the
courts, in fact, will be doing is to balance the interest of an innocent purchaser
of a signed completed instrument and the interest of the duped signer who has
received no consideration. If a reasonable signer, in all the circumstances of the
case, should have realized that the paper was susceptible of completion as an
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The signer's lack of specific intent would be a defense, which
the signer would have the burden of establishing, just as under
section 3-805(2) (c), the signer must establish the defense that
there was "such misrepresentation as has induced the party to
sign without knowledge or opportunity to learn of its character
or essential terms."
The case would be extremely rare where such lack of intent
could be established, since most instances involve signatures
to printed forms, such as checks, left blank as to payee, date,
and amount. One can, however, suppose a signature placed on
a piece of paper to be used in the preparation of a facsimile of
the signer's signature on, for example, form letters, and then
the typing of words of an instrument above the signature. The
holder in due course would argue that he was nevertheless
entitled to recover since there was a failure to enumerate such
a "real defense" as we are now considering in section 3-305(2),52
and since the failure to guard the paper or to put words upon
it precluding such a completion was negligence contributing
to the unauthorized completion which bars the defense under
section 3-406.11 Such a construction would leave section 3-115
without significant meaning, and should not be adopted by a
court, if ever a case arises where the signer can persuade the
trier of fact that he did not sign the paper intending that it be-
come an instrument. And if some specific listing of this defense
instrument, it is probable that the requisite "intent" will be found to exist.
The entire thrust of the Code's protection of the holder would tend to guide
decision in this direction. Cf. UCC § 3-406 and note 53, infra.
52 The "real" defenses as outlined in UCC § 3-305(2) are:
Sa) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as
renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instru-
ment with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain
knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and
Sd) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes
the instrument.
53 The section was drawn to adopt the rule of Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253
(1827), exonerating a drawee who paid an instrument so carelessly drawn that
the alteration was not easily detected. It extends the rule to the protection of a
holder in due course. It pre-supposes negligence of a type which assists the
criminal act of alteration or forgery in such a way as to cast liability upon such
person, rather than the second person dealing with the criminal. In view of the
official comments, it may be doubted whether the situations calling for the
application of this section will go much beyond the prior case law, except in
one area. In view of UCC § 4-406(2), the person who is negligent in the ex-
amination of his bank statement and report of forgeries may also find himself
liable to a holder in due course of subsequently forged checks.
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in section 3-305(2) is needed, it could be found in paragraph
(b) as an illegality "in the transaction rendering the obliga-
tion of the party a nullity."
Imposter and Fictitious Payees
The N.I.L. had no provision on the imposter situation. The
Code does not go into refinements as did the "face-to-face" or
"dominant intent" rules,54 but states in section 3-405(1) (a),
simply, that any indorsement in the name of the payee is effec-
tive, if an imposter, by the use of the mails or otherwise has
induced the maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or
his confederate in the name of the payee. For the rule to apply,
the definition of "issue" in section 3-102(1) (a) must be satisfied,
and this means the first delivery of the instrument to a holder
or a remitter. Thus, until there has been a delivery to the im-
poster or his confederate, an indorsement by the named payee
is required. After. such a delivery, anybody's indorsement of
the name of the payee is effective, presumably even that of a
thief who stole the instrument from the imposter.
The same technique of requiring an indorsement, but of
permitting the indorsement by any person to be effective, is
carried over in section 8-405(1) (b) and (c) to the "fictitious
payee" situation, the one in which the maker or drawer, or one
authorized to sign in his behalf, intends the named payee to
have no interest in the instrument. This seems to be a more
realistic approach than that of the N.I.L. which used the device
of classifying such paper as "bearer" paper.Y5 This obviously was
not true and could lead to trouble where successive transfers
were made.
The Code, to avoid insuperable problems of proof, recognizes
the indorsement of the payee's name by any person, but the re-
maining indorsements must be in order.
54 See the excellent discussion in Abel, "The Imposter Payee, or Rhode
Island Was Right," 1940 Wis. L. Rev. 161. The author makes the point that
in ever imposter situation, there are two people who must deal with the
crook-the one who issues the check and the one who takes it for value from
the crook. He suggests that the rule of decision should be on a case-by-case
balancing of the equities and negligence of the two parties, with the loss falling
upon the more careless of the two. The Code appears to place the loss on the
first actor in every instance, because in commercial law definite and predictable
results are desirable if they are just and correct in the great majority of in-
stances. In the imposter situation, it seems that the first actor is usually the
more culpable.
55 N.I.L. § 9(3).
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In recognition of modem business practices, and of the
statutes or amendments to the N.I.L. adopted by eight states,56
the Code, in the fictitious payee situation, considers not only the
intent of the signer, but also that of an agent or employee of the
maker or drawer who supplies the name of the payee. The
theory of this is that the actual signer, under modem condi-
tions, does not have any specific intent about most checks or
other instruments. He relies on vouchers and other documents
prepared by subordinates. In the case of corporations using
mechanically-sortable punch card checks and a mechanical
check-signer, it seems clear that the controlling intent should
be that of the employee who sets up the machine to produce the
check by putting the requisite employee record cards into the
machine.
The theory is that the risk of loss from the "padded payroll"
and like situations should be a risk of the business and not a
banking or check-cashing risk, since the signature is valid. This
is admittedly a close question on policy, in view of the Anglo-
American policy of putting the risk of forged indorsements on
the party cashing the check for the forger. 7
Some problems of interpretation will also arise. It seems
clear enough that once we have a "padded payroll" type check,
an indorsement in the name of the payee by any person will
be effective. But when do we have a "padded payroll" type of
check? The key will lie in the interpretation of the words "if
an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him
with the name."58 Under this phrase, if unauthorized persons
having no connection with the business break the locks on the
machines in the dead of the night and run off a series of checks,
the issuer probably will not be held responsible by reason of
section 3-405 of the Code. If an employee, such as a janitor,
who has no occasion, in the course of his employment, to handle
the payroll cards should succeed in inserting a few cards of
employees whose employment had terminated, and in abstract-
56 Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico and
Wisconsin.
57 This is the general rule, to which the imposter situation, discussed supra
note 54, is but an exception. However, other civilized legal systems reach the
opposite result where an instrument bears an apparently unbroken chain of
indorsements. See Husted, op. cit. supra note 13 as to French, German, Italian,
etc. rules.
58 UCC § 3-405(c).
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ing the completed checks, would any indorsement in the name
of the payee be effective?
On general principles of agency, it would seem that the
principal would not be liable in these cases under section 3-405
unless it could be established that the person causing the ma-
chine to emit the checks was an agent or employee of the issuer
for the purpose of dealing with the preparation of checks or of
specifying the names of payees. Under section 8-406, however,
the issuer might be precluded from asserting the particular forg-
ery if it could be established that the issuer by its negligence
in the operation of the machine is found to have contributed
to the unauthorized signature. As is commonly the case, the
issuer, by its contract with the bank under which a check-signing
machine is used, may have agreed to indemnify the bank against
all liability in paying any check bearing the actual imprint of
its machine. While the issue here is one, not of the validity
of the signature of the issuer, but of the validity of an indorse-
ment admittedly not a valid indorsement at common law, the
purpose of the indemnity would be to shift the risk of unauthor-
ized use of the mechanical signer. The indemnity would be broad
enough to cover the use of the signer in the padded payroll
case but probably not in the imposter situation 0
A practical word of warning. Business concerns in Code
states should review their insurance coverage with a view to
securing protection against these shifts in risk of loss.
Warranties to a Payor
The problem of the extent of the warranties made upon a
sale or transfer of a negotiable instrument is a vexing one, and
must of necessity be treated elsewhere."0 But one change in the
law is worth mentioning.
59 UCC § 4-406(5) provides:
If under this section a payor bank has a valid defense against a claim
of a customer upon or resulting from payment of an item and waives or
fails upon request to assert the defense, the bank may not assert against
any collecting bank or other prior party presenting or transferring the
item a claim based upon the unauthorized signature or alteration giving
rise to the customer's claim.
This rejects the rule of at least two New York cases holding that the
bank is not obliged to assert such a defense, Fallick v. Amalgamated
Bank of N.Y., 232 App. Div. 127, 249 N.Y. Supp. 238 (1931); National
Surety Corp. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 188 Misc. 207, 70
N.Y.S.2d 636 (1946) aff'd without opinion 188 Misc. 213, 70 N.Y.S.2d 642
(1946).
60 See N.I.L. §§ 65, 66; UCC §§ 3-414, 3-417.
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At common law, and under the N.I.L., warranties were con-
sidered a part of a sale or negotiation, and not, therefore, in-
herent in a payment transaction. At least the cases seem over-
whelmingly to have reached this result.61 The language of
N.I.L., section 65, provided for the warranties of a "person
negotiating an instrument by delivery or by qualified indorse-
ment." Section 66 states that "every indorser who indorses with-
out qualification warrants to all subsequent holders in due
course." A payor did not fit this language, yet payors obviously
needed a right of recourse against those presenting instruments
not complying with the warranties.
Theories of quasi-contract were not sufficiently definite and
certain for the commercial world, nor was it sufficient protec-
tion to rely upon clearing house agreement. The result was
widespread demand for and acceptance of the "all prior indorse-
ments guaranteed" stamp.62
Under section 8-417 of the Code, certain warranties will
run to a good-faith acceptor or payor as well as to subsequent
holders.
One warranty, however, is not made to a payor or to an ac-
ceptor and that is a warranty as to the genuineness of the draw-
er's signature. 3 Thus the famous case of Price v. Neal64 is left
6 1Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Bank of Rutherford, 115 Tenn. 64, 88
S.W. 939 (1905); Figures v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 117 (1917). See
also Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Bank, 64 Ga. App. 696, 14 S.E.2d
227' (1914); Louisa Natl Bank v. Kentucky Nat'l Bank, 239 Ky. 302, 39 S.W.2d
497 (1931).
62The effect of this language was to give the paying bank and all collecting
banks a contract action against the party with whom each had dealings, elim-
inating the equitable defenses available in a quasi-contractual action for money
paid under mistake of fact, such as the non-liability of an agent collecting bank
which had paid over the proceeds to its principal, etc. The use of the stamp also
eliminates any doubt that a restrictive indorsee makes such a warranty. The
N.I.L. was not clear on this point. See 2 Paton's Digest 1921 (A.B.A. ed. 1940).63 UCC § 3-417 (1) (b) establishes a general warranty only that the presenter
has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is "unauthorized"
(includes forgery, by definition) and then goes on to state:
Except that this warranty is not given by a holder in due course acting
in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature, whether
or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor of a draft if the holder in due course took the draft
after acceptance or obtained the acceptance without knowledge that
the drawer's signature was unauthorized ..
The position of the italicized words "acting in good faith" is, at first blush,
puzzling in view of the definition as "honesty in fact" in UCC § 1-201(19), as
applied to a warranty of "no knowledge". The comments are not helpful. How-
ever, when it is remembered that the warranty is an implied warranty, the words
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undisturbed. It is in fact codified, with certain of its exceptions,
by section 3-418 on finality of payment. The presenter does
make a warranty of no knowledge of an unauthorized signature
of the maker or drawer, except that "a holder in due course act-
ing in good faith" does not give this warranty to the maker or
drawer himself. Nor is the warranty of no knowledge given by
such holder in due course to an acceptor of a draft, if the
knowledge of the unauthorized signature was obtained after
such holder took an accepted draft or after such holder obtained
the acceptance.
SOME CHANGES IN PRESENTmENT, NOTICE AND PROTEST
On just the technical side alone, the Code has done yeoman
service to lawyers in gathering together in one place the ma-
terial on presentment, notice of dishonor, and protest, found
scattered through some sixty-odd sections of the N.I.L.65 In
addition, many of the rules were simplified and modernized so
as to eliminate as many traps for the unwary as possible. For in-
stance, under the N.I.L., presentment had to be made at a proper
place, at a proper time, and in a proper manner.!6 Failure in any
element of time, place, or manner would invalidate the present-
ment with consequent potential discharge of secondary parties.' 7
Under the Code, any demand for payment is a proper present-
ment.68 Conceivably it could be made between the acts of a play
in the lobby of the theatre. It is up to the party to whom pre-
sentment is made to require exhibition of the instrument at his
office during business hours if he so desires.69 A refusal to pay
stated in the theatre lobby would, however, be a sufficient
dishonor.
will probably be construed as applying to any overt conduct or words accom-
panring a presentment with knowledge which have the effect of lulling the payor
and stifling his usual precautions in the examination of signatures, etc., especially
in the case of signature by an agent.643 Burr. 1354 (1762).
05 N.I.L. §§ 7, 70-75, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85, 86, 89, 90-109, 111-116, 118, 129,
130, 143-48, 150-60, 186, 193.66 N.I.L. § 72.
67 See Bear v. Hoffman, 150 App. Div. 475, 135 N.Y. Supp. 28 (1912); Eagle
Lumber Co. v. Oil States Lumber Co., 154 La. 854, 98 So. 270 (1923); In re
Redmond, 15 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1936); Ironclad Mfg. Co. v. Sackin, 129
App Div. 555, 114 N.Y. Supp. 42 (1908).
68 UCC § 3-504.
69 UCC § 3-505.
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Required protest, under the Code, is now limited to the truly
international bill, one which on its face appears to be either drawn
or payable outside of the states and territories of the United
States and the District of Columbia.7°
Another beneficial change in the law, made by the Code,
is in the rules governing the effect of delay in presenting a check
for payment. A check can become "stale" for three purposes:
first, as to whether the drawee bank is obliged to pay it;7 1 second,
as to whether it is overdue in determining whether a taker is a
holder in due course;72 and third, as to whether the holder, on
dishonor by the drawee, has lost rights against secondary
parties.73 The periods of time are not the same for each situation.
Under Article 4 of the Code, the bank, in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, is not obliged to pay a check which
is more than six months old when presented. 74
A demand instrument, at common law and under the N.I.L.,
became overdue if it was in circulation beyond a "reasonable
time" after its date or its issue, whichever was later.75 In the case
of a check, the period was not certain. A Kentucky case held
that a check was overdue after nine months,7 and in adjacent
Tennessee it has been held not to be overdue although six months
old.77 Both cases were on the issue of whether holder-in-due-
course status could be achieved.
The Code clarifies the issue as to holder-in-due-course status
in section 8-304(3) (c), by providing that a check drawn and
payable within the states and territories of the United States and
7oUCC § 3-501(3).
71See UCC § 4-404, providing that a drawee bank is not under obligation
to honor a check that is more than six months old. Statutes of this type were
in existence in over one-half of the states prior to the Code. See 1 Paton's Digest
1111 (1940, Supp. 1957) tit. Checks § 20.6, listing 32 non-Code states and the
District of Columbia.
72 See the cases digested in Beutel 719, applying N.I.L. § 53, as to the
"overdue' status of demand instruments "negotiated an unreasonable length of
time after its issue."
73 See N.I.L. § 186, requiring presentation "within a reasonable time after
its issue" and discharging the drawer "to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay." See the cases on the problems thus raised digested in Beutel 1291-1304.
74 UCC § 4-404.
75 N.I.L. §§ 53, 186. The postdated instrument was, when taken after its
date, considered as issued upon its date for the purposes of these sections.
76Fayette Nat. Bank v. Meyers, 211 Ky. 185, 277 E.W. 292 (1925), aff'd
221 Ky. 186, 298 S.W. 378 (1927), 39 Harv. L. Rev. 757 (1926), 14 Ky. L.J.
355 (1926).
77Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. American Natl1 Bank, 165 Tenn. 66,
52 S.W.2d 149 (1932), 17 Minn. L. Rev. 319 (1933).
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the District of Columbia is "presumed' "to be overdue when it is
taken more than thirty days from its issue.78 Parenthetically, it
should be noted that protest is only required where the outside-
of-the-United-States character of the instrument appears "on
its face" regardless of the actual facts. In the present problem,
however, the thirty-day presumption arises from the facts, not
the face of the instrument. Thus, if one takes his checkbook to
Europe and there issues a check, the thirty-day presumption does
not apply even though the check, on its face, appears to have
been issued in Philadelphia and to be payable in Philadelphia.
In such a case, the Code continues the old familiar "reasonable
time" rule.7
9
Where the issue was whether timely presentment had been
made for the purpose of holding secondary parties liable, the
law under the N.I.L. was very largely the "one day" rule in the
case of checks. The cases held that a holder of a check who did
not present the check one day after he had received it, if drawn
on a bank in the same city, had discharged prior indorsers ab-
solutely, and had discharged the drawer to the extent of the
loss occasioned by the delay.80 If the check was payable in an-
other city, the collection process must be initiated by the day
after receipt.8" These rules, based largely on fear of bank fail-
ures, were unreasonable, and were not in accord with the prac-
tices of reasonable people.82
8The use of the word "presumed" in this context brings into play the Code
definition of the word in UCC § 1-201(31), as meaning that the trier of fact
must find that thirty (30) days is a reasonable time "unless and until evidence
is introduced which would support a finding of" a different time as reasonable.
A note of caution should be sounded here. Once such evidence is introduced,
the local law will apply to determine the effect of the introduction of evidence
upon the presumption. Counsel relyting upon the 30-day period may still be re-
qired to produce affirmative evidence as to its reasonableness if under local
law the presumption "disappears" upon the introduction of the necessary quantum
of evidence. See Morgan, "Some Observations Concerning Presumptions," 44
Harv. L. Rev. 906 (1931), "Instructing The Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden
of Proof," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59 (198) passim. Courts should not, however, once
evidence is introduced destroying the presumption, revert to the former rules of
decision. Such action would violate the entire spirit of the Code provision.
79 UCC § 3-503.8 0 E.g. Seager v. Dauphinee, 284 Mass. 96, 187 N.E. 94 (1933). The cases
are collected in Beutel 1296-1302.
81 See cases collected in Beutel, loc. cit. supra note 80.
82This court-made rule did not take proper account of the varying habits
of different sections of the community. At certain periods, even large public
utility concerns are not able to process all checks received on the day of receipt.
Small business concerns often do not bank every day, and individuals frequently
carry checks in their pockets for several days. Latent distrust for the banking
system has largely vanished. With the advent of Federal Deposit Insurance, a
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The Code, by section 3-503(1) (e), provides that, with respect
to the liability of secondary parties, presentment is due in the
case of demand instruments within a reasonable time after such
parties become liable thereon. Subsection (2) of that section
contains familiar-sounding language providing that "a reason-
able time for presentment is determined by the nature of the
instrument, any usage of banking or trade and the facts of the
particular case."
This subsection continues with special rules for an uncertified
check which is not a draft drawn by a bank, but which is in fact
drawn and payable within "the United States." Before stating
the rules, mention should be made of the fact that in the holder-
in-due-course area, the thirty-day presumption applies to all
checks.8 3 The rules we shall now consider exclude certified checks
and bank drafts which presumably should be subject to dif-
ferent rules involving a longer time.84 Further, this subsection
uses only the term "drawn and payable within the United States,"
while in the two other areas, the wording is "states and terri-
tories of the United States and the District of Columbia." Of-
ficial comment 3 to this section refers to "uncertified checks
drawn and payable within the continental limits of the United
States." The recent admission to statehood of Alaska and Hawaii
renders the comment somewhat obsolete and the intended dis-
tinction somewhat arbitrary. 5
longer period should be reasonable. Where business men are sufficiently con-
cerned over the length of time that checks may be outstanding to do something
about it, the printed legend on the check "Void after days" usually selects
a 30- or 60-day period as reasonable in the circumstances.
83 UCC § 8-304(5) provides simply that: "a reasonable time for a check
drawn and payable within the states andterritories of the United States and the
District of Columbia. ..."
Note the absence of the words "uncertified" and "which is not a bank draft"
found in UCC § 8-503(2). A court could, however, consider certification, etc.,
as a fact bearing upon the "presumption." See, however, note 84, infra.
84 Consider the use of such instruments as deposits on bids, earnest money
on contracts, all indicating that the payee will retain the instrument for varying
periods of time. Case law has recognized this difference. See, e.g. National
City Co. of N.Y. v. Mayor and Council of City of Athens, 38 Ga. App. 491,
144 S.E. 836 (1928) (sixty days' holding of cashier's check accompanying bid
for bonds of city not unreasonable where presented promptly upon fulfillment of
conditions of the bid).
The situations justifying the longer holding of such checks do not disclose any
policy to be preserved by allowing trafficking in such items. Hence the omission
of the exception in the holder-in-due-course area.
85 Taken literally, the "presumption" will apply to a check drawn in Alaska
or Hawaii for presentment in New York, but not to a check drawn in the Virgin
Islands or Puerto Rico for presentment in Miami, Florida. The use of the word
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The rules adopted are again stated in terms of a "presumed"
reasonable time of thirty days after date or issue, whichever is
later, in the case of the drawer, and seven days after the date
of the indorsement in the case of an indorser."8
Just why the Puerto Rican indorser of a check payable in
New York should remain liable for longer than seven days while
the Hawaiian or Alaskan or Californian is not, is not altogether
clear, and since the seven-day period is only a "presumed" reason-
able time, decision could well go the other way. The definition
of "presumed" in section 1-201(31) reads:
"Presumption" or "presumed" means that the trier of fact
must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and
until evidence is introduced which would support a finding
of its non-existence.
Thus, introduction of evidence of the ordinary mail time between
an outlying Hawaiian island and the New York bank should
justify extending the time in such a case.8 7
CONCLUSION
It is not possible 'within the limits of the space allotted to this
article to do more than outline some of the changes made and
to try and do this in such a way as may give some flavor of the
whole and an insight into the factors considered in making the
change. It is not contended, however, that Article 3 of the Code
will produce a complete absence of litigation in the law of com-
mercial paper or result in complete uniformity among all fifty
states, should it ever secure complete adoption. Article 3 does,
however, modernize and consolidate the statute, attempt to pro-
"presumed" will enable the courts to avoid substantial injustice, and, absent
another rash of bank failures, the p oint is not apt to arise.
86 UCC § 3-503(2) (a) and (b). Of course, a problem of proof will arise
as to the date of indorsement, as indorsements, except machine indorsements in
course of bank collections, are seldom dated. But indorsement obviously means
indorsement effectual to transfer rights, and, therefore, requires delivery, of which
evidence is more readily available in the usual case.
87 In all such cases, careful attention should be given to the words "or to
initiate bank collection if there is no delay in the collection." (Emphasis added).
Thus, the time limits are those in which the item should be deposited in the
holder's bank, which presumably is a local one.
Also, the use of jet planes to carry the mails should make the distinctions
rather meaningless. The thrust of the legislation is to extend the strict judge-made
"one-day" rule, and, if anything, the tropical nature of the excluded areas justifies
a lengthening of time limits, not a shortening.
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vide clearer language in situations where authority was divided
under the N.I.L., and clear up ambiguities in fringe areas. The
Code will not alter the substantial core of uniformity already
achieved under the N.I.L., and it does not make any radical
changes in the law of negotiable instruments as applied to com-
mercial paper. The law of negotiable instruments under the
N.I.L. consists of a mass of detailed rules, monotonous to all
except a few devotees, unrelieved by exciting policy conflicts
except in the area of allocating responsibility for losses caused
by forgery. Under the Code, in all probability, it will remain
that way.
